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Summar)' or Result. 
We introduce a new twc>party protocol witb tbe rollowinl 
properties: 
1. The protocol giYes a proor or the niue, 0 or I, or a 
particular Boolean predicate which is (a.s.sumed to be) 
hard to compute. This extends tbe 'inter&etiu proor 
systems' or 171, which are only used to prou that a 
cert&in predicate has nlue 1. 
~. The protocol is proubly mlnlmum-kno .. l~ce in tbe 
sense that it communicates no additional knowledge 
(besides the nlue or the predicate) tbat migbt be used, 
ror exsmple. to compromise the private ley or a user or a 
public·kq cryptosystem. 
3. The protocol is rHult-lndlstlnsulshable: an 
eavesdropper. overhearing an execution or the protocol. 
does not know the value or the predicate that was 
proved. This bit is cryptograpbically secure. The protocol 
achieves this without the use or encryption runctions, all 
messages being sent in the clear. 
These properties enable us to derine a mlnlmum.kno .. l~re 
cryptosystem. in which !ach user rec~ives exactly the knowledge be 
is supposed to receiv> and notbing more. In particular. tbe system is 
proY:1~ly secure against both chosen· message and chosen·ciphertext 
:lttack. ~Ior~over. ext.nding the Dime-H,lIman model. it allows a 
user to encode me~sag~s to other users with his own public Iey. 
This enables a symmetrIc: use or public·hy encryption. 
1. Introduction 
Transrer and ,,,ch:lnge or knowledge is the basic task or any 
communic:ltion system. Recently, much aU,ntion has been gi,·en to 
the process or knowledge !xchange in the context or distributed 
systems :lnd cryptosystems. 
In 171 Gold\Y:l.Sser. ~Iicali. and Rackorr developed a comput:ltional· 
complexity approach to the theory or knowledge; a message is said to 
----_ .... _-_.-
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convey knowledge ir it contains information wbich is the result or a 
computation that is intractable ror the receiver. They introduce the 
notion or an intertldive proof Iyllem ror a language L. This is a 
protocol ror two inter:lcting (probabilistic) Turing machines. whereby 
one or them. the proller. proves to the otber. tbe ualidtltor. that aa 
input string z is in ract an elem@nt or L. Th validator is limited to 
tractable (Le. probabilistic polynomial·time) computations, We do 
not limit the computational power or tbe prover; in tbe cryptograpbic 
cont@xt. the prover ma), possess some secret inrormatioa - ror 
example. th .. ractorization or a certain integer N. (Tbis is analogous 
to the rollowing model or a "proor system" ror a language Lin NP: 
given an instOlnce z E L. 1n ~.;p prover computes a string II and sends 
it to a deterministic polynomial.tim@ ~·tllidator. wbieh uses 11 to cbeck 
tbat indeed z E L.) 
An interactive proor system which releases no ildditional knowledge 
-- that is, nothing more thiln the one bit or knowledge given by tbe 
assertion that z E L ... is called minimum·lmotL'ltdge. :--:aturally. 
such inttractive protocols are of parlicular inter~st in a cryptographic 
setting where distrustrul users with unequal computing power 
communicate with e:lch other. 
In this paper we extend the a.bility or interactive proof·system 
protocols rrom vtllidation that a giHn string z is in a language L to 
verl/i.'ation whether z E Lor rIeL. That is. we give the rirst (non. 
trivial) example or a language L so that both L and its complement 
have minimum·knowledge interactive proor systems ror validating 
membership, whHe both the proor or memb .. rship in L and the proor 
or non·membership in L ar! by means or the .tlmt protocol. 
Furthr.rmore. by rollowing the protocol. the prot'er demonstrates to 
the ~·r:rifir:r eith!r that z E L or that 1: e l.. in such a way that the 
two cases are indistinguisbable to an eavesdropping third party. In 
ract. the protocol releases "0 Jrnowledgt at all to an eavesdropper. 
As usual, we assume that the eavesdropper knows both the prover's 
and the "drier's algorithms and tbat his computational reSources are 
polynomially bounded. and we allow him access to all messages 
passed during an execution or the protocol. In spite or tbe fact that 
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our protocol make, no u,e of encryption functions, tbe 
eaHsdropptr r~c!iyts no /mowledge about wbethtr be bas ju~t 
witnessed an interaetiu proof of tbe a.ssertion tbat z E L or of the 
a.ssertion that z fL. We call this proptrty of our protocol 
renit-indiltingui3habilitll. 
The a.s.sertion that our protocol is minimum-knowledge both witb 
rtspect to the nrifitr and with respect to tbe e&nsdropper relies 01 
no unprond a.ssumptions about tbe complexity of a number·tbeoretic 
problem. 
tr membership or non·m.mbership in L is an intractable 
computation. then. after an ''(ecution of our protocol, tbe string z 
can serve as a cryptographically secure encoding - shared only b, 
tbe pronr and the nrifier - of the membership-bit (z E L). The use 
of z as an encoding of tbe membership-bit exemplifies wbat we may 
call minimum-knowledge crwt~aphr: it \, a probabilistic 
encryption with the property tbat neither its specification (i.e. the 
inuractin proof of the nlue encoded by z) nor its furtber use in 
communication can possibly release any compromising knOWledge, 
either to the verifier or to an eavesdropper. The minimum-
knowledge requirement is a property whicb ensures tbat e&-eh party 
receins exactly tbe knOWledge he is supposed to recein and nothing 
more. A cryptosystem whose protocols are minimum· knowledge hu 
tb. strongest security ap;~~t pa.ssin attack tb" We could hope to 
pron; in particular. it \, seC'Ue against both cbosen-messap;e and 
chosen-cipbertext atta.ck. 
Moreonr, we show how to extend tbe use of public keys in 
encryption systems. As introduced by Dime a.nd Hellman and 
studied further by many a.uthors, public·key encryption would seem 
to be inherently L55ymmetric: messages sent to user A art encryptld 
Wling A's public Key. (See. e.g .. 14, gl.) When interaction\, added to 
tbe model. it becomes possible to perform ,ymm~ric public-key 
encryption. (See a.l5o [51.) Using our protocol, we specify a 
probabilistic minimum.knowledge public. key cryptosystem. in whicb 
A's public key is used to encode messages that are sent to A u well 
a.s to encode messages that A sends to otbel"3. In some appliea.tions, it 
is useful tba.t only one of a group possess an encryption key whicb 
can b. used ror all communication.. 
It is by seria.lly composing sneraJ minimum-knowledge sub-
protocols that we formulate the more complex minimum-knowledge 
proof.system that w. introduce in tbis paper. We remark that this 
demonstrates the importance of tbe minimum·knowledge property for 
modular design of complex protocols. 
Tbe predicate that our protocol tests is th&t of being a quadratic 
residue or non·residue mod tv for a certain number tv (whose 
fa..:toriutioD may b. tb, pronr's secret informatioa). W. 1I0ti that 
the language for whieh We show membership and non·membel"3hip is 
in :>''P n :~"''P. A conventional memb~rship proof for these 
languages uses the ractorization of ,V, whil. in the interactive proof 
system presented below no extra knowledge labout the factorization 
or about anything else) is given either to the v.ririer or to 1.0 
eavesdropper. 
An important motivation in our work on this protocol comes from 
our desire to guarantee the 5eeurity of cryptogra.phic keys. tr tbe 
• integer tv is the prover's public key in a public·key cryptosystem. 
then N is not compromised by (polynomially ma.ny) executions of our 
protocol; a polynomially bounded opponent knows no more &fter 
witnessing or participating in these executions than he knew before 
the hy was used at all. ~tore precisely, the probability that the 
opponent's computation succeeds in compromising IV is essentially 
the same, whether or not his computaotion is allowed to see tbe texta 
or the mes.uges p&55ed during the executions of the protocol. 
2. Interactive Proof Systems 
We specify the model for whieb We will describe our protocol; this is 
an extension of tbe model used ill 171. Two probabilistic Turing 
macbines A and B form an int~4ctilJt p4ir 0/ Turing m4ehinu if 
they share a read-only input tape and a pair of communica.tion tapes; 
one of the communication tapes is read-ollly for A and writ~only for 
B. wbile tbe otber is read-only for B a.nd writ~only for .11,.; Tbe two 
machines take turns being "active". Wbil. it is active, a. ~aebine 
can Toad the appropriate tapes, perform computation using its owo 
work tape, and send a message to tbe other machine by writing tbe 
message on it! write-only communication tape. In addition, B ba.s a. 
private output tape; whatner i~ written on tbis ta.pe wbea A and B 
halt will be the result of their computation. 
In what follows, B will be limited to random polynomial time. wbile 
we make no limiting a.ssumption a.bout A's computational resources. 
(For cryptographic applications, A will possess some tra.pdoor 
information). Their messag"' to each other will be in cleartext 
(though th~se messages will depend on their private coin nips. which 
will remain hidden I. OUT scenario will also include a tbird 
probabilistic Turing machine C, limited to polynomial·time 
computation, which can read the communication tapes or A and 8 
and knows their algorithms. .11,. will be the proYer, B will be tbe 
verifier. and C will be the eavesdropper. 
In the setting of complexity theory, what do we meall by 
knowledge! Inrormally, a message conveys knowledge if it 
communicate~ the result of an intractable comput:ltion. A message 
that consists of the result of a computation that w. cap e:LSily carry 
out by ourselHs does not conHY knowledge. In particular, a string 
of random bits - or a strinl! of bits that\' "jlld\'tillgu\'habl." (rom 
a ra.ndom string (see below) - dotS not CODYey knowledge, since We 
,. 
~:1n nip coins by ourstlvu. Our rormal dtrinitions rollow. 
~.l. Interactive Proor Systtms 
Suppose that (A. B) is an intHactiH pair or Turing machints. and 
Itt 1 ~ to. I}' denote the set or legal inputs to the computations or 
A and B. SuPPOSt also that L ~ 1 is a language. ror which A is ablt 
to compute the prtdicatt (z E L). SuppOSt in addition that thtir 
totaJ communication timt is polynomiaJ in the length or the input 
and in 1/6, whHe their computiltion is correct with probability I-~ 
(i. •.• "with high probability"). Following the autbors or 171, we will 
say that (A, B) is a "alidetina interactille 1I~ool'8y8tml ror L ir: 
1. For any z E L giun a.s input to (A, B), with high 
probability B halts and accepts z. 
:!. For any Turing machine A ° which can interact with B. 
and ror any string r ~ L given a.s input to IA', B), with 
high probability B halts and rejects z. 
E.,lending tho above d.rinition, we will say that (A. B) is a 
r:eri/"i"q interacti"e lI~ool"Y"mI ror L ir: 
• For any Turing milchine A ° which can interact with B, 
and ror any string z E 1 given a.s input to (A 0, B), with 
high probability B halts with the correct value or the 
predicate (z e L). 
In the rirst derinition. we require that B correctly accept instances 
or strinp z'e L. and tbat DO malnolent adversary caD convince B to 
incorrectly accept strings z ~ L. In tht s.cond dtfinition. w. require 
that, given any string z, B correctly veriry whtthH z E L or z f L. 
:!.2. Ensembles or Strings 
In order to speal precisely or the "knowledge" trilnsmitted by 
communicated messages. Wt will nttd tbt rollowing dtfinitions 17, 101. 
L.t 1 ~ {O. I}O b. an infinite nt or strings, and Itt c b. a positive 
constant; ror tacb z e 1 or length n, let 1<. be a probability 
distribution on the stt or n<·bit strings. We will caJl 
n - { 1<. : z e I} an enlmlble or strings (usually 3uppressing ilny 
m.ntion or 1 and c). 
For eumpl •• ir ~I is a probabilistic Turing machine, then any input 
string z derines a probability distribution. according to the coin 
toss.s or M's computation. on the set Mizi or possible outputs or M 
on input z. Thus, ror any I. { Mizi : :: E I} is an ensembl •• 
As another example. suppose that (A. B) is an interactive p3.ir or 
Turi~g macbin.s. For any string '" let (A. B)I:I d.not. the s.t or 
possible ordered sequenc.s or m.ssages writt.n on the communication 
Lap.s or A and B during their comput3.tion on input z. This s.L ha.s a 
natural probability distribution according to Lhe coin toss.s of A and 
B. Tbus, { (A, BHzl : z e 1 } is an eru.mbl. or strings. 
A diltingTli./a1!l' is a probabilistic polynomiaJ·tim. Turing macbine 
3 
~~at. given il Hring a.s input, outputs 3. bit. Suppose tbilt 
n = { "6:" E I} and rr - { "6':: E I} are ~nstmbles or strings, 
and that D is a distinguisher. Let 1I0(z) be th .. probability that D 
outputs a I wh.n it is given ~ input a string or length 1:1<. randomly 
selected according to probability distribution "6; and let PO'(z). 
d.pending on the distribution 1<.', be define.d similarly. W. will call 
tb. two ensembl~s (polynomial-tim.) indi6Iingui./aablc ir ror any 
distingui5her D, (or all k and sumeiently long z, 
Ipo(z) - 1I0'(zll < Izl-·· 
~.3. ~Iinimum Knowledg. 
Suppose that IA. B) is a validating interactive proor·system for a 
language L. taking inputs rrom the set I. Following :!le d.finition in 
1;1. w. Will say that the system (A, B) is minimum.knowledge ir. 
giHn any probabilistic polynomiaJ·tim. Turing machin. BO. th.r. 
txists another probabilistic polynomiaJ·tim. Turing milchin. ~{ such 
that: 
L ~I can us. BOas a subroutin., in tbe strong sense 
d.sr.ri bed b.low . 
2. The ens.mbles { ~I\zl : z E L} and {(A, BO Jlzi : z e L } 
are indistinguishabl •. 
~I's output. on input z E L. is a simul:l.Lion or the communications 
that A and B' would haye on the same input. :"ote thaL. in this 
d.finition, we do not car. 3.bout inputs not belonging to L. All 
.av.sdropper who ov.rb.a.rs a successrul .xecution o( tbe protocol 
( ..... B) with input r learru that (witb higb probability) r e L; 
bow.Yer. h. gains no more knowledge than tbis. 
!o.t can us. BO as a subroutin. in tb. rollowing way. We mod.1 tb. 
probabilistic nature or BO by providing it witb a random r.ad-o·nly 
tape. In the course or (simulating A and) communicating witb BO, ~ 
is allow.d to back up a r.w st.ps in the simulated protocol. re-setting 
B"s random read-head to wh.r. it hild be.n earli.r, ilnd then to 
proc •• d with the protocol. 
We now show how to eltt.nd this derinition so 3.5 to b. able to S3.y 
wh.n a more ,en.ral sort or protocol should b. caJled "minimum-
knowledge". The comput3.tions or any interactive pair o( Turing 
machin.s (A, B) d.rine a partial (unction IA.a a.s rollows. Giv.n a 
string z a.s input. suppose tht A and B us. a total or at most e 
random bits during the course or tbeir probabilistic comput3.tions (e 
polynomial in Izl). ror any kobit string r, Itt IA.a(z,~) denote the 
result or the computation or A and B (i. •.. what is I.rt on B's output 
tap.) on input z, when the sequence of their coin nips is giYen by r. 
In this pap.r. I .... a(z.~) will only tilie on Boolean values. For 
.umple, ir (A, 8) is 3. proor·syst.m ror the language L. th.n 
IA.a(z.~) is (with very high probability. i .•. ror most r) equal to the 
m.mbmhip·bit (z E L). 
We will say that the interactive system (A, B) is 
minimum-knou:ltdgt if, ginn I.ny probl.bilistie polynomial-time 
Turing ml.chine BO, tbore exists another probabilistic polynomial-
time Turing machine ~i sucb that: 
1. Ginn any input r, ~i hu one-time access to an oracle 
which returns the value I A.S(z, r) for a random 
rE {a, I}·. 
Z. ~f can us. BO u .. subroutine, u described above. 
3. The ensembles {MlrJ: z E I} and {(A. BO)!zl : z E I} 
are indistinguish&ble. 
:-;ou that, in this der.nition. the simulation M[zl is der.ned for any 
z E I, 
In or1,r to motivate this der.nition, we recall that we are trying to 
formalize th. notion of the .amount of knowledge transmitted by a 
sequence of messages. Speaking informally. one g&ins no knowledgr 
from a message which is the result of a reuible computation that one 
could just :u well h&ve c&rried out by oneselr. For us. "feuible" 
means probabilistic polynomia.l-time. 
U the purpose or a protocol followed by two inter&cting parties A 
I.nd B is that A transmit to B a value IA.riz. r), we would like to be 
&ble to uy exactly when the protocol tr&nsmits no more knowledge 
than tbis value. We might also demand that tbe protocol accomplish 
tbis eYen if B somehow tries to cbeat - tbl.t is, eYen ir the Turing 
machine B is replaced by I.notber (polynomil.l-time, bu~ poeaibly 
cbel.ting) macbine BO. Tbe simple t1l.nsmission or tb. nlue 
IA,s(z, r) can be modelled by a single oracle query (witb input z). U 
tbe provision or this oracl. query makes it pos.sible, by melons or I. 
polynomial-time computl.tion, to simulate tbe entire "connrSl.tion" 
that A &nd BO would h&n h&d on iaput z, tbea it seems reuoDl.ble 
to 5&y that when A and BO actually have I. conve"l.tion (Le. rollow 
the protocol) with input z, thore is no AdditionAl knowledge 
transmitted to BO • 
When a user performs A's role in' I. minimum-knowledge protocol, 
relying on the security guaranteed by the minimum-knowledge 
proporty, it is the use'-s responsibility not to chel.t (i.e. to carry out 
.,,·s instructions exactly), since the guarantee or security may not 
hold ir A is replaced by a cheating A 0 • 
Note that if I A•S is computable in probl.bilistic polynomial time, 
then the I A.s-orade alids no power to the macbine M. In this cu. M 
(or. for that mattor. B) can compute I A.S without the assistance of 
A. (The protocols that we pr.sent in this paper are all minimum-
knowledge; however. they may be only triYially 50 ir it turns out thl.t 
integer factorization, ror example, is a tractable problem.) 
Suppose that we are given two protocols: the r."t. taking inputs 
rrom II' is I. nlidating interactiu proor·system for Lp and the 
second. taking in puts from 'z' is a validating interactive proof-system 
for Lz. Suppose in addition tbat LI r;;/2. We will use in wbat rollows 
the simple observation that the concatenation or Lbo two protoeols is 
then a validating interactive proof·system ror l.z, taking inputs rrom 
II' Ir the two given protocols are minimum-knowledge, tben so is 
their concatenation. 
2 .•. Result Indistinguishability 
We will call an interactive proof-system (A. B) r~ult.­
indistinguishable ir an eavesdropper (u described abon) wbo bu 
access to the communications o( A and B on input z gains no 
knowledge. More formally, the system (A, B) is 
rt3u/t-irtdiltingui3haltle ir there exists a probabilistic polynomial-
time Turing machine M such that tbe ensembles { Mizi : z E I} I.nd 
{ (.-t. BOlizl : z E I} are indistinguisb&ble. 
Observe that unlike the ml.cbine M in th. der.nition or the 
minimum-knowledge property, tbis macbine M does not bave aceesa 
to an orade ror lA,S; in other words, M can simulate tb. 
communications of A and B on input z, regardless of the value 
I A.s(z. r) (eyen ir calculating I A.B is an intractable eomputation). 
Since this simulation is by means of a re&.5ible computation that Ion 
eavesdropping adversary could carry out for himselr, the I.dYe"..,)' 
gains no knowledle it be is given tbe text or a "conYe"ation" 
belongi~, to the communieations ensemble (A, B)[zl. 
3. Specification of the Language 
3.1. Preliminaries 
We assume tbat the reader is familiar witb the rollowing notions 
rrom elementary number theory. We will be working in tb, 
multiplicative. group ZN° or integers rell.tively prime to N. ADY 
element: E Z,,,,,o is called a ~Atb-Qtic ruidu. ir it is & squart mod N 
(Le. ir the equation z2!11 l mod N hu a solution); otberwise. l is a 
qUAdratic nortre3idue mod N. Given Nand z E ZN°, the qUl.ntity 
called the Jacobi 4ymbol of I witb respect to N. denoted (-~), can be 
emeiently computed (in time polynomial in log IV) and takes on Lbo 
values' + I and -I. U (~),. -I, then 1 must be a qul.dratic 
nonresidue mod N. On the other band. ir (~) - +1. then I may be 
either a residue or a nonresidue. Determining which is the ease, 
without knowing the factorization or N, IlppU" to be Iln intractable 
problem. namely the ~adratic re6idu04ilr problem. (However, give!l 
the prime factorization or N, it is e3.3Y to determine whetber or not I 
is I. quadratic residue.) Several cryptographic schemes have been 
proposed whicb b&se their security on the a.s.sumed dimculty or 
distinguishing between residues and non residues modalo a hard-to: 
rllctor integer N 16, 1. 81. 
Tbe protocol introdueed in 171 is a minimum-knowledge validating 
interactive proof·sysHm for the language 
{(,V, ~) : ! E l,,,', : a nonresidue mod N}. 
The protocol that we present below is a verifying interactive proof. 
system, which is both minimum·knowledge and result· 
indistinguishable. for :l language ba.sed on the same problem. 
We will use the notation L11"1 to repnsent the number of distinct 
prime factors of an integer N. 
Our protocol will be concerned witb .egers of a special form, 
nam.ly integers with prime factoriution ,'11- n:_ 1 Pi'; sucb that 
(or some i, Pi';" 3 mod •. Let BL (for Blum, who pointed out th.ir 
usefuln!SS in cryptographic protocob) denote the set of such integers. 
Ther. :lie two alternate (equivalent) formulations of membership in 
BL: (1).V E BL if and only if for any quadratic residue mod ,'II, 
halt its square roots (mod 111) have Jacobi symbol +1 and halt its 
square roots have Jacobi symbol -1. (2) N E BL irt there exist.a a 
quadratic residue mod ,'II which bu two square roots witb dirterent 
Jacobi 5y m bois. I~I 
Tbe special integers that we require rorm a subset or BL, namely 
N - { N; ,'II E BL, N - 1 mod., ~"\1- 2 }. 
It is not hard to Ste that tbis set may equinlently be defined as 
N - { liqi; P ,to q prime, i, j ~ I, pi ali qi iii 3 mod. }. 
Finally, we define the languages 
1- {(N,l): NE N, zE IN-' (~)-+l} 
and L = { (S, :) E f: I a quadratic residue mod N }. 
.:;.. Taking f as tbe set or inputs, this paper gives a verifying interactive 
. ,~ proof·system ror L. 
3.2. Outline or the Protocol 
Throughout the description of our protocol, we will be speaking of 
picking elements of " set "at random". Unless otberwise specified, 
this will mean that the element in question should be chosen at 
random according to the uniform probability distribution on the set. 
Our protocol has two parts. Tbe first part is a nlidating 
interactive proor·system tor I. U tb. first part is completed 
success(ully (i.e. it .At. proves to B tbat tbe input string is in I), then A 
and B per(orm tho second part of th protocol. Tb. Stcond part, 
taking inputs rrom the set f, is a ,erifying interac~ive proot·system 
for the language L: A proves to B eitber tbat the input string is in L 
or that it is not in L. Botb parts are minimum· knowledge, and the 
Stcond part is result·indistinguishable a.s well. (Thus, an 
eavesdropper who overhears a success(ul execution o( tbe protocol 
lntns that, with high probability, N e N. But he g:uns no more 
knowledge than this - in particular, he dotS not learn RES,..{:).) 
,Jb. rllSt part, tbe l'alidation tbat an input string (N, I) belongs to 
w::s,;~:--.,-. -.-
I. in turn requires three stages. which are carried out in tbe tollowing 
order: each stage validates a property or .Vor of :. 
\. :v Oil 1 mod 4, ~.\1 > 1. : E l.,,·, and (:0=+1. 
2 . .ve BL. 
3. ~IIJ) S 2. 
While proving that our proto~ol bas tbe properties tbat w. desire, 
we will make no limiting ~umption about tbe computational power 
of Turing machino .At.. Howe,er, we remark tbat tbe protocol caD be 
perrormed by a probabilistic polynomial·time Turing macbine A 
which is given the tactorization at the relevant integers N. (In the 
cryptographic applications that we discuss later. the party that 
p.,(orms A's role in our protocol will hayo chosen N along wit II its 
prime tactorization.) 
We now give the details o( our protocol: the validating first part in 
section 4, and·the veri(ying second put in section 5. 
4. Validation or the Input 
In each o( the protocols that w. describe, w. will use tbe notation 
".At. - B: , .... to indicate the transmission of a· message trom A to 
B. 
4.1. Blum's Coin·Flip Protocol 
Our validation protocol will require that A and B jointly g.nerate a 
sequence of unbiased random bits. They will do this by tollowing a 
protocol due to Blum 121 • 
An integer N e BL, tV - 1 mod ., i, ginn. 
A and B generate a random bit b: 
\. B chooses u E IN' at random, computtS V" u2 mod N; 
B - A: ., 
2. :\ ~hoo!es q ... + 1 or -1 at random, his guess ror (~); 
A - B: q 
3. B '- A: u 
4. If q - (~) then b :- 1 ebe b :- 0 
Ir ractoring N is an intractable problem, then the first alternate 
characterization of BL implies tbat this proto~ol generates random 
bits. In fact, as long as at least one of A and B does not cbeat - i.e. 
1.5 long as either .At. picks q at random or B picks u at random - b is 
a random bit. 
This protocol is also minimum.knowledge. To prove this, we rIX a 
(possibly cheating) Turing machine B- that interacts with A. We 









machine ~{ whose output, on input N (satisrying N E BL and 
N .. 1 mod 4), is a simulation or tbe communicatioos ensemble 
(A, BOll NI, namely a triple (II, fI, u) as specified above. M can un 
BO u a. subroutine, and hu access to an ora.cie that returns the 
intended result or this prot~ol, namely a random bit. 
M begins by cOMulting the ora.cie. Having receind tbe random bit 
" M executes the pro~ol with BO (letting BO "send" II, simulating 
A's cboice of 17 in step 2 by nippinl .. coin, .. nd then lettins BO 
"send" 11). [f the bit generated by tbis execution is b, then M outputs 
the triple (11, fI, u). Otb.,wise, M r~seta BO's ra.ndom read-head, gOtS 
back to step 2. "sends" -fl instead of fI to BO, and lets BO "send" u'; 
now M outputs tbe triple (II, -fl, u'}. [n either C35e, the output triple 
corresponds to the bit b, and the distribution or its possible values is 
indistinguishable from (A. BOll NI. (:'\ote that if B· ,joes not rollow 
tbe pro~ol exactly 35 specified, it may happea that the numbel'3 ~ 
and u' are not the same; but they must have tbe same Jacobi symbol 
mod N, because lb. ability to compute ~wo square roots (mod N) 0( 
II with oppositt Jacobi symbols would enable B· to ractor N.) 
4.2. Tbe Validation Protocol 
This is a minimum-knowledge validating iatera.ctive proof system 
by which A proHs to B that the input string (N. z) is in the la.ngUllgf 
I defiaed above. [t consists of three sub-pro~ols, each of which 
takes, u legal iaput, a string that bu beea validated by the 
j - pre-cedin, sub-protocol. 
~ 
-~ First Stllre: The trivial properties of .'01 a.nd z 
This staae involves no communications betweea A and B. B cbecks 
tbat N .. I mod 4, that N is not a prime power, tbat z E ZN°, and 
tbat (*)-+1. Each of these is euily accomplished ia time 
polynomial in log N. [t anyone or these conditious does aot hold, 
tbea B rejects the input and halts the protocol. 
Second Stare: ':01 belongs to BL 
The following protocol is also due to Blum 121. Its correctaeS! 
depends on the alternate characteriu.tions or membel'3hip in BL. [n 
order to gurantee that the protocol is correct with probability at 
leut 1-5, the parametH k should be chosen 50 tha.t k ~ log 1/6. 
This stage does not concern itself with 1 at all. N must satisry 
N!II I mod 4; this condition will hold if tbe first staae wa,s 
successrully completed, 
Repeat k tim .. : 
I. A chooses a quadratic residue r E ZN· at random; 
A - B: r 
2. B chooses fI- +1 or -I at random; 
B-A:17 
3, A com put~s 3 suc h that 3Z ~ " mod Nand (y) - 17 ; 
A - B: 3 
4. B o.h~ek5 to mak~ sur~ that , satisfies tbe IlboYf 
conditions; ir not, th~n B rejects the input and halts tbe 
protocol. 
Third Stare: .v h35 two prime ractol'3 
This stage also does not concern itself with z. 
Let us use ZN·(±l) to denote the set of elements of Z~/ with 
Jacobi symbol ±I (respectively). This protocol relies oa the fut tbat 
ir .V has enctly i prime ractors (Le. ,{l'J) = i). then ex&etly I/rl 
or the elements or Z ..... ·(+I) are quadratic residues. A Ilad B jointly 
pick random elements or ZN·(+I). tr A can show that about hair of 
them are residues (e.g. by producial their square roots mod 1\1. tben 
B shoul<l be convinc~d that £1.'01) S 2. tr N is not a prime power, 
then 1.1.\1 must be t.,ual to 2. 
[n order to pick a list or random elements or ZN°(+I), A and B 
rollow Blum's coin-nip protocol, whicb requires tbat 
.v E BL and N .. I mod of. These conditions will hold if tbe secoad 
stage was successfully completed. 
[n order to guuantet that tbe protocol is correct witb probability 
at least 1-6, the parameter II sbould (accordinl to tbe weak law of 
lara. numbel'3) be chos~n so that II ~ 15/6. 
1. A and B use Blum's coia-nip protocol to generate II 
random· el~menLS ""' .. '"11 E ZN°(+I). Elements of 
Z ..... • ar~ generated bit by bit, aad thost with Jacobi 
symbol -I are thrown away. 
2. For each i-I, ... , II sucb that fi is a quadra.tie 
residue. A computes 'i sucb tbat ". - 'i2 mod .'01; 
A - B: 'i 
3. B checltS that at least 3/8 of tbe "j are quadratic residues; 
ir so he ac'.pts the input, aad otherwise he rejects it and 
halts the protocol. 
Th,,'oreml This protocol is a minimum-knowledge validating 
int.ractiv-. proor system ror the language I. 
Proofl We will treat eacb or the three sub-pro~ol stages 
separately. [t will then rollow immediately that the concatenation of 
the thr •• has tbe required properties. 
The nrst stage is, trivially, a validating proof syst~m ror the 
languaae 
II = {(N, z):.V == I mod 4, £1"'1 > I. z E ZN·' (~)=+I }, 
because each or these conditions can be validated by B without 




Giy~n an integer .v _ I mod 4 (in particular, giveD iDput that bas 
bun validat~d in the (irst stage), tbe ~ond stace is a minimum-
knowledge validuing interactive proor syHem ror tbe langu&ge 
12 - { (N, :) : N E BL }. 
If N E BL, then each quadratic residue, seDt by A bu at leut on. 
square root mod N with Jacobi symbol + I and at lelLSt one square 
root mod N witb Jacobi symbol -I; no matter wbicb SigD U B 
cboostS. A can respond witb a square root or tbe appropriate sign. 
OD tbe other h:Lnd, ir ..... i BL then no quadratic residue mod N b:u 
two square rooU with Jacobi symbols or opposite sign. Witb higb 
probability, ror some i A will be unable to send aD appropriate 'i' so 
that B will halt the protocol. The only way ror a cheatinll A ° to 
conyinee B that , .... E BL (by s.nding tbe appropriate .!emenU 'i) is 
by guessing berorehand the entire sign·sequence ul' •.. ,u.; 8uch a 
luess will only be correct with probability 2-'. Thus, thu protocol is 
indeed a validating interactive proor system ror BL. 
To prove the minimum.knowledge property, we rlX a Turing 
mlKhine BO that int.,acu with A; we have to specify the 
computation or a Turing machine M whose output, on input N e BL, 
will be a simulation of the communications that A "nd BO would 
ban had OD input N: namely, the ensemble (A, BO)I NI which 
consisu or triples ('i' ui' 3i) satisfying the conditions implicitly 
defiDld by the specificatioD or the protocol. If BO departs so rar from 
tb. protocol that these triples are not produced, tbeD A will quickly 
balt the protocol; simulating the communicatioD.S between A and 
such a BO is euy to do. In other words, without loss of generality we 
may 3.SSume tbat BO behaves "reasonably". 
M repeau the following loop Ie times: 
1. choose, E ZNo at random 
. 2. r := ,2 mod N 
3. "send" , to BO, and receive u in returD 
4. ir (~) "u then re-set the ~ndom read· bead of BO and 
go back to step I; else output ( " u, , ) 
For each iteration, the expected number or times tbis loop will bave 
to be repeated is 2. since for any .alue of , the probability that 
(.~) - u is exactly 1/2. The triples produced by M do satisfy tbe 
required conditions. and so the ensembles MI N I and (A. BOll N I are 
indistinguishable. This completes the proof ror the second stage. 
Ginn an integer from the set 
{ N: NE BL. N lEI I mod 4, .... lV) > I } 
(in particular, gi.en input that hu been oalidaied in tbe second 
stage), the third stage is a minimum·knowledge validating 
interactive proor system ror the language la - { (N. :): v{lll) - 2 }. 
7 
Consid., the experiment or choosing a ra.ndom ~I~ment of Z ",O( + 1), 
where the "xperiment is a success if tbe choson el~ment is a quadratic 
r"sidue mod ;V; let F .,; .... , denote tbe frequ~ncy or succe~es in II 
independent trials. As mentioned above. the probability of success in 
one trial is exactly 1/:1"1"'1-1. (Since N is known to bave at lea.st 
two prime faetors, this probability is at most 1/2.) If V{Nl is exactly 
2. then the probability that B does not accept N is. by tbe weak law 
of large numbers. 
Prob{ F.,{ "'.1 < 3/8} ~ 
I 
Prob{ IF .,(.'1/) - 1/21 ~ 1/8} < -- - 16/11. 
- 411(1/8)2 
On the other hand. if N hlLS more tban two prime [actors, the 
probability of success in one trial is at most 1/4, and thus the 
probability that B will incorrectly accept N is 
Prob{ F .,(,'1/) ~ J/8} ~ 
Prob{ IF .,(,'1/) - 1/41 ~ 1/8} ~ 16/11. 
(1"ote that tbese estimates of probabilities are also correct [or B's 
interactions with another Turing machine A 0. because even a 
cheating A" C:Lnnot bias the biu generated by Blum's coin-nip.) 
Hence this protocol is indeed a va.lidating interactive proof system for 
{N: v{,V}=2}. 
To prove the minimum·knowledge property. we have to specify tbe 
computation of a simulating Turing machine M. (Once &lain. u 
disctl!5ed above, we can as,ume tbat BO behans "reasonably".) The 
communications ensemble (A. BOll NI that M must simulate consisu 
of m:Lny Blum coin-nips which were used to generate random 
elements of Zs". The difficulty ror ~i is tbat those elemenu wbich 
are qU:Ldratic residues must be randomly generat~d along with tbeir 
squar~ roots. 
GiHn N such that &.1,'1/)=2. ~f proceeds as follows: 
1. i:- 0; ,1:- the empty list 
2. do until i=k': 
·:hoose " randnm bit 6 (to decide the Jacobi symbol or 
the npxt el.mont g'ner:Lted): 
if 6=0 then adjoin to.1 a ra.ndom element or Z",O(-I). 
.else: 
a. i:= i+1 
b, choose.; E Z."o at random 
c. choose a r:Lndom bit 6; ; 
if 6;=0 then 'i:- ',z (a random residue in 
Zs'(+lll 
else " ,- -.,= (mod ,\1 (a random non·residue in 
Z","(+ 1)) 
d. adjoin', to ,\ 
3. simulate Blum's coin.nip in order to 'generate' the 
sequence or bits in the resulting list .1 (as in section 4.1) 







5. for eacb ri in .t sueh that bi-O output 'i 
~1 ,enorates lists of .Iements of Z.,," with thr same distributioD ~ 
do A and B'. so that the communications ensemble fA. B"lI NI and 
tbe output ensemble ~1( .'1 I are indistin~uishable. This completes tbe 
proof for tbe third stage. 
It is worth remarking that. with 3/8 replaced by suitable constanl3, 
the tbirt:! stage is a minimum-knowledge interactive proof sY$lem for 
the nlu. of ,.o(;~l. That is. if the fraction of the ri tbat aD honest A 
shows to be quadratic residues is at least 3/8. then B should accept 
that "'.\1 ~ 2: if this fraction is betwHn. say. 3/16 and 3/8, tben B 
sbould accept that ",."1 ~ 3; anoi 50 on. 
Finally. we see that. given any input string at all. the concatenation 
of the three stag.s is. a minimum-knowledge validating interacti," 
proof system for tbe lilnguage Tl n 12 n 13 - T. 
5, The Minimum-Knowledge Test or Residuosity 
U the validating part of our protocol has been successfully 
completed. then with high probability tbe input string (N, :) is in the 
language T. In particular, we know that ~l"') - 2, that: E ZN"' and 
that (~) _ +1; these are tbe properties that are required by tbe 
Dext part of the protocol. 
This part is a verifying interactive proof system for L, taking iDputs 
!'rom I. A pair (N, z) wbich is knowD to belong to I either is or is Dot 
abo a member of L according to whether or not I is a quadratic 
residue mod N. Thus, since it is also result-indistinguishablt, this 
part may be regarded as a printe inter~tive test of quadratic 
residuosity mod N. 
To make tbe exposition clearer, we will present tbree 5uccessin 
versions of our protoco\' 
Let, !II -1 mod N. Everything tbat follows will bold for any non-
residue y E Z.,,· which ha.s Jacobi symbol +1. As long 3.\ 
. '1 E BL and N 3 1 mod 4, we can take y - -1. U another non· 
residue y is desired, A can prove to B (as an additional sub-protocol 
stage) that 'I is a non-residue by following the minimum-knowledge 
iDteractive proof-system of 171. 
Let us fix !ome notation. For any r E ZN' we define the p,.dieate 
{
I if r is a quadratic residue mod N, 
RES • .,~r) -
o otherwist. 
Rtcall thilt Z.,,·(+I) denotes the set of elemtnts of ZN' with Jacobi 
symbol +1; hair or theSt are quadratic residuts mod N. and half of 
tbem a.re non-residues. 
Our protocol relies on tbe fact tba~ if r E ZN" is cbosen at random, 
then r: mod N is a random quadratic residuf in tbe set ZN'(+I) and 
r mod N is a random quadratic non-residut in Z.,,"(+I); similarly, 
:r: mod N is tithtr a random ,"sidue or a random non-residue iD 
ZN'(+I) according to whHher or not: is a residue mod N. 
In ordtr to guarantee that the protocol is correct witb probability 
at le3lit 1-6. the parameter Ie should be choseD so tbat 
k = n (I"g 1/6). 
first version 
Iterate 3k times: 
1. B chooses r E Z N" at random 
2. B chooses c E {I. 2. 3} at random: case c of: 
1: r:-,:l m"d N 
2: r:-r modN 
3: r;-:r: mod N 
3. B - A: r 
4. :\ eomputes b =< RES.~r); 
:\ - B: 6 
5. B checks that if c - I then b - I. ir c - 2 then b - 0, 
and if c - 3 then b is consistent with any previous 
iterations ror which c was =< 3: ir not then B halts tht 
protocol 
U tbe protocol is Dot baited by B, ~ben tbe consistent value of b ror 
ca.,.-3 itentions is equal to RES.~z). 
As explained above, if : is a quadratic r.sidue tbeD r's coostrllcted 
in case 1 are indistinguishable from r's constructed in case 3. If A 
acts as specified. then when the protocol finishes B will be convinced 
that: is a residue. The only way tbat a cheating .... " caD convince B 
that z is not a rtsidue is by correctly gutSsing, among all iterations 
during which B has sent a residue r. which of tbese were constructed 
in case 1 and which of them in case 3. The probability of succts.sful 
cbea.ting is less than :;C~. for a smtable constant C. Similarly if z is 
a quadratic non-residue. Hence the above version is a verifying 
interactin proof-system for L . 
Ho .... ever. this Hrsion is not result-indistinguishable. An obStrver of 
an execution of the protocol can easily teil whtther he is watcbing an 
inter~tiH proof that RES . ):) = 1 or a proof that RES • ...,.{zl - 0 by 
keeping a tally of the bits b sent by A in step 4 or each iteration. 
Second version 
But a $imple modilication of tb. aboH protocol does hide Lbo result 
from an t1vesdropper. At the beginning. :\ nips a (air coin in order 
to decide whether to IJse Rlr),.. RES.".(z) or Rlrl -'I-RES~r) as 
the bit b to bt sent to B in step 4 of each iteration througbout the 
protocol. Rlr) can b. rtgardtd as an encoding, cbostn at random. o( 
RES.Jz). 
In step 5. S checks for consistency in the obvious way: S should 
receive the same bit 6 in all cue-I iterations and the complement&ry 
bit in all case-2 iterations; S should receive a consistent bit b in all 
case-3 iterations. ind i~ value indicates to S whether or not I is a 
quadratic residue .. <\s b~fore. if in step 5 of any iteration S finds that 
the value of 6 is not eonsistent then S bal~ the protocol (detecting 
cheating). 
With this modification. the protocol is still ... arguing as above - a 
Yerifying interactive proof.system for L. Furthermore. it is result,. 
indistinguishable. An eavesdropper expec~ to oYerhear one bit about 
2/3 of the time during step 4 of each iteration and tbe 
complementary bit the remaining 1/3 of the time; whether the 
majority bit in a particular uecution of the protocol is 0 or I gives 
him no knowledge. A formal proof of rtsult.indistinguishability of 
the full protocol is pr .. sented below. 
Howenr. the version so far pruented is not minimum· knowledge. 
For example. a cheating S· that wanted to find out whether a 
_ particular number - 17. say _. is a quadratic residue mod N could. 
during one of the iterations. send % - 17 in step 3 iMtead of an 
element % constructed at random accorciing to steps 1 and 2. A's 
response in step 4 will conuy to S" tbe value RES,...(17). which is 
something that S· could not have computed by bimself. 
ThIrd venlon 
We can make this a minimum.knowled,e protocol by refininl sUp 
~~ 3 of the Yfrsion just prtsented; the refinement consisLt of several 
interactive sub·steps by which S provu to A that the element z 
whicb he sends wu constructed u specified. (The rut of tb, 
protocol is unchanged.) 
All computations are modulo N. 
3.0 S - .<\: % 
3.1 S chooses 'i E ZN· at random (i - I •...• U) 
3.2 S computu 
TJ - { 'I' .... I.: 'i - li2 mod .V}. 
T: - { 'HI' ...• Iz• : 'i - 1II i2 }. 
T3 - { ': •• 1' •.•• '3.: Ii. ni: }. 
T. - { 13."1' ...• 'd: Ii. IIU? }. 
T. a ran<:lom permutation of the elemeaLt of 
T\ U T2 U T3 U T.; 
S - .<\: T 
3.3 A chooses S. a r"ndom subsequenet of T of size 2k; 
A - S: S 
3." S adds to S randomly chosen elemenLt of T-S. forming 
an enJazged set g sucb tbat the 4 subseLt gnTj ale tbe 
same sile; 
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for each Ii E g. S - A: 'i 
3.5 A verifies (for each Ii E 5") that Ii = either 'l. 1I1l. IIi2• 
or YUi: mod N. with each congruence being satisfied by 
1/4 of the elements of 5"; if not. then .<\ hal~ the protocol 
3.6 ror each 'i E T-5". B computes Wi according to the table 
below: if % was chosen as case c of step 2 and Wi E Tj • 
then Wi := the table·entry in the J' row and c·b column; 
ror each tj E T-5". B - A: Wi 
3.7 A verifies (ror each Ii E T-S) that w? I!I either 
(%I i ). y(%t i). :1%1;). or y:1%I,) mod N. witb fach 
congruence being satisfied by 1/4 or tbe elemenLt or 
T -5"; if not. then A halts the protocol 
The protocol now continues as before .. <\ sends 6 - R(%) to B (step 
4). and S checks 6 ror consistency (step 5); and then tbey continue 
witb step I or the next iteration. 
t;- ... 
Table for Step 3.11 
,.2 
(c- 1) 
z .. '.' 
r 
(c- 2) 
............. _ ............. ,----
yr~· -
JY/%Ii) 
_ ......... _ ................. _ .. _._----
_ ........................ ,----------
The idea is that B must rollow the protocol. because ir be tries to 
cheat .<\ will. witb /lnrwhelming probability. detect bis cbeating 
either in Step 3.5 or in Step 3.7. This is rormalized in tbe rollowinl 
proof. 
Theoreml Ginn input belonging to I. this protocol is a result.-
indistinguishable minimum·knowledge nrirying interactive proof. 
system for L. 
PI'OOI't First we prove tbat tbe protocol i. & verifying proof·system 
for L. Since we have already shown that this is true or tbe second 
._- -------------------------------------
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version presented above, it will suffice to show that the refinement or 
step 3 preserves this property. 
Suppose that • is a qudratic residue. The question is wbethtr , 
cheating A" can .use the numbers unt by B during step 3 to correctl! 
distinguish bet ween case-l iterations (z - ,:: mod N ror a random r) 
and case-3 iterations (z ... ;:,:z mod NJ. Since B has chosen them at 
random, A a will be unable to distinguisb btlwetn residues Ii or the 
rorm 'i2 and residues Ii or the rorm .,t The sub-table whicb 
corresponds to these rour pos.sibilities has rows which are 
ptrmut:ltion. or oach othtr. and tbus A" will not b. abl. to tell 
whether B i. using column c .. 1 or column c - 3 or the wbol. tab I •. 
c - 1 c=3 
J .'! 
I 
Similarly ror non-resi<lues Ii or the rorm lI'i2 or IIZ'i~' A lih analysis 
holds if z is a non-residue mod N. Henc. tbe protocol is indeed a 
Yerirying proor-system ror L. 
In order to proYe tbe minimum-knowledge property, w. rlX a 
Turing m&cbine Ba tb&t inter&cts witb A; we must d.scribe tbe 
computation or a simulating macbine M. As b.ror., w. &Mum. that 
Ba behans "r.a.sonably" .nousb so tbat (witb bi,b prob&bilityJ A 
does not halt the protocol. 
M has acc.ss to an oracle ror the result or tbe protocol. M begins 
by qu.rying tb. oracl. on the input string (N, zJ. and I.arns (with 
high probability) the value or RES • ..,.{:). The rest or tbe simulation is 
quit. similar to that or the proor tht tbe protocol or 171 is minimum-
knowledge. 
As its next step, M nips a coin to simulate A's choic. or whetber to 
comput. R(z) - RES:dz) or R(z) - l-RES • ..,.{z) during tbe protocol. 
In tacb iteration, ~f carries on the protocol tbrough the end or (the 
refinement of) step 3 in a straightforward mann.r: Muses Ba to 
prrform its own Yersion or B's rol., and ~f e&5ily simulates A's role, 
choosing a random subsequence S in step 3.3 and checking several 
congru.nces mod N in steps 3.5 and 3.7. The difficulty com.s in 
simulating A's commu'nication in step •• which consists or the bit 
R(z): how can M quickly calculat. tb. correct value or RESMz)! M 
&Ccomplish.s this by savins the mes.sages "sent" so rar, re-seuins tbe 
random read-h •• d or Ba , and r.-starting the iteration. Tht s.cond 
time through tb. iteration, B" "nips t he same coins" and thereror. 
"sends" the sam. numbH z (St.p 3.0) &nd the same sequence or 
Dumb.,., T (St.p 3.2) &5 the first tim.: bown.r, M (continuing its 
probabilistic computation) "nips new coins" while simulating .... in 
sttp 3.3. Thus. with higb probability the simulated A chooaes a 
subs~quence S which is dirTertnt from tbe subsequence S chos.n tb. 
first tim~: the ~nlarged sets ~ and 5' will also be dirTer~Dt. Now M 
can choose an index i ror which Ii e ~ (so that Ba sent 'i in step 3 .• 
the first timt through the it.r:ltion) and Ii f 5' (so that B" sent Wi in 
step 3.6 tht second timt through the iteration). M can use 'i to Ste 
which row or the table B" used (i.e. which set Tj contains Ii); then M 
C:ln use Wi to set which column c or the table B" used. The cboic. or 
~olumn gives ~1 the value or RES,..,.{z), whicb can now be used to 
simulatt ~f's communication of R(z) in step 4 or tbe iteration. B" 
then .:ompletes t he iteration. 
By .:onstruction. the output tnsemble computed by this machine M 
is in·jistlnguishable rrom the communication tnsomble generated by A 
and B". and thertrort the protocol is indeed minimum-koowledge. 
In order to proVt that the protocol is r.sult-indistinguishable, we 
must ~p.ciry the computation or a probabilistic Turing machine M' 
which will simulate the communications ensemble (~, B)[N, zJ. 
(Recall that ~f' does not bave .ccess to any oracle.) M' besins by 
nippinS a coin to decide wh.ther to simulate the choice R(z) - 0 or 
the choic. R(z) - 1. Th.n in each iteration M' simulates the. 
specified computations of A and B, except ror the rollowing ella",es. 
In (simulated) step 2, M' chooses %:- ~ mod N with probability 
2/3 and z :- y~ mod .v with probability 1/3. In (simui&ted) step ., 
M' outputs b == R(z) ir Z:o z.:: and b - l-R(z) ir z ... II~. (H.re 
the sim'Jlation or step 4 is much simpler than in tho minimum-
Itnowl.dge proor above, since M' "knows" bow each z 10&5 
constructed.) In (simulated) step 3.6, M' outputs Wi computed 
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The numbers z output by ~f' have the same distrib'ution &5 the 
numbers z output by B: the sam. is true or the I; and the Wi' Hence, 
as r.quir.d, the output eosembl. M,/.V. zJ is indistinguishable (rom 
Ii 
the communications ensemble (A. a)IN. zI. 
As several people h~yt pointed out. there is ~nother modification or 
the first nrsion or our protocol which also ~chieves result.-
indistinguishability. :\ can always respond in step • with the true 
va.lue or RES.,,~z) ir a computes each z in step 2 a.ccording to , 
random ehoke a.mong rour yarieties: to the types ,.::. y,.::. and 
z,:J mod ill we add the rourth type y"':; mod .V. If the protocol iJ to 
b. minimum-knowledge :u well. we can refine step 3 as in the third 
version or our protocol. adding an appropriate rourtb column to tbe 
table used to compute !Di' 
6. Cryptographic Applications 
[n all our applications. we will IH .'II be the public ley or a user A 
who lnows its ractorization. Within the set N. it will be most 
advantageous to A to cboose N to be or the rorm .'II.,. pq. with p and 
q or approximately the same size. A can rollow our validatins 
protocol in order to prove to any other user that II{N) =- 2. 
[n communicating with another IIser a. any element: e Z .... ·(+I) 
c~n serve :u an encoding or the bit RES ... ~:). as soon as A has used 
our protocol to prove to a the Yalue or this bit. Accordins to need. z 
can be cbosen by A or by both A :lnd a together. 
Thus a sequence or random numbers z" :2' ...• :. can serve :u aD 
encryption or tht bit.-s.quenct RES...,(:l). RES...,(~) •...• RES...,(z.). 
whicb in turn can be used as a ant-time pad. stnt either rrom A to a 
or rrom a to A. 
Instoad or usins tbe :i directly to encrypt tbe bits RES.oJ:i)' we can 
defint a much more emcient scheme by usinS 
RES.oJ:,). RES • ..,,(:.z) ••..• RES • ..,,(z.) :u the random sted ror a 
cryptographically secure pStudom-r1.ndom bit gtner1.tor bued on N 
(e.g. 11I.13!). Sharing the seed ... \ and a ClLn emcientlY generate 
polynomially many bilS and use them a.s 1. (very Ions) one-time pad 
with which to send messages back and rorth. aecause our protocol is 
only used in order to initialize the system. tbiJ scheme has low 
~mortized cost. 
Whether tb. ~its RES."~:i) are used directly or to rorm the seed or 
a pseudom-random bit generator. the resulting schemes h~ve tbt 
minimum-lnowledge property with respect to a a.s well as with 
respect to an eavesdropper C. In particular. they are provlLbly secure 
against both chosen-message and chosen-cipherttxt attack. 
Another characteristic or these schemes is worth noting. Unlike tbe 
usual assymmetric use or public keys ror encryption. in which only 
messages sent to user A may be encrypted using A's public key. our 
scheme is !ymmdric; messages sent to A :u well as mesnges that A 
sends to others art encodtd using A's public key. TbiJ capability ia 
userul in a number or situ~tions. For ex:Lmple. it enables secure 
communication with casual users (wbo are not registered iD tbe 
public key directory). [t also enables i\ ~o transrer tbe same raDdom 
bits to a group or users. SO tha~ ~acb member or the group will bt 
able to broadcast secret mess~es to all members. (See also 151·) 
Another application or our protocol gives ~ new priYatt unbiased 
coin-nip. generat.d jointly by A anda. The two users simply cbOOllt 
: at random .- ror .nmple. choosing its bits by means of alum's 
coin-nip. (Note tha~ the bits or : are public; it is RES...,(z). tbe result 
or the coin-nip. which is private.) 
[n certain applications we can omit tbe validating proor that N is 
or the r.quired rorm. Suppose in ract that N ba" more tbaD two 
prime rae tors. For any z e Z .... ·(+l). A can carry out the Yeriryins 
protocol as berore. Now. however. ir y &nd I - both qaadr1.tic non-
residues in ZN·(+l) ._- h&ve dirrerent quadratic ch~racter modulo 
one or the prime factors or N. then A can distinsuisb numbers of tht 
rorm ,.:. rrom numb.rs or the rorm y,.:: mod N. and can distinguisb 
each or these rrom numb~rs or the rorm z,.:2 mod N. (This.iJ not true 
ir II{N) - 2; recall that ror such N any non-residue in ZN·(+l) is a 
nOD-residue modulo both prime ractors or N.) Thus A c~n. at will. 
Ust our verirying protocol to "prove" to a either that z is a residue 
or tbat I is a nonresidue. In either case. tht inter~tively proyt~ 
value or RES~I) - whetber or not it iJ tbe true value - is 
. . 
cryptographically secure. [n ract. A can use tht same Dumber I U a. 
private bit-encoding with eacb or two dirrerent users. neith.r or 
whom will know the value or the others bit. 
1. Conclusions and Open Problems 
Goldwasser. Micali. and Rackorr gin a minimum-lnowledge 
protocol ror proving th&t a number is a nonr.sidue mod N. whtre N 
m~y be any integer at all: there is also a minimum'lnowledse 
protocol ror proYing that a number i! a residue mod N. ag1.in ror 
general ill 171. Howeyer. the two protocols do not ban the same 
rorm. Our protocol ror proving the value or RES • .,.(z) has tbe same 
form. whatever ~hat Yalue is. On the other hand. we require a 
minimum-knowledge proor that ill is or a special rorm. There 
remains the problem or constructing ~ single protocol ror RES.oJ:) 
th~t holds ror general N. 
~for. generally. one would like to see examplu or minimum-
knowledg. interactive proor systems ror oth.r languages. 
As a rormalization or th. notion or security ror cryptosystems. tbe 
minimum-knowledge property seems to be the strongest possible. 
Therefore. its absence is ea.sier to demonstrate than other types or 
cryptanalytic vulnerabilities. Indeed. sev.ral or tbe cryptograpbic 
schemes tbat ban beeD proposed are easily seeD not to ban tbt 
miDi mum-knowledge property. 
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